UK Strategy in the Gulf and Middle East After American Retrenchment by Stansfield, G et al.
2018 Fall 231
UK STRATEGY IN THE GULF AND MIDDLE EAST AFTER AMERICAN RETRENCHMENTARTICLE
ABSTRACT This paper considers the impact of the possible relative decline of 
the U.S. and its engagement in the Middle East and the Gulf in particular. 
U.S. disengagement started under the Obama Administration and seems to 
be continuing under the Trump Administration. Applying theories of ‘rival 
hegemonic transition,’ possible post-American successors are identified. In 
particular, the UK’s intents, capabilities, and strategies as it returns to ‘east 
of Suez’ are examined, along with the geopolitical implications of such a 
return for the shifting balance of power in the Middle East.
The default U.S. post-war grand strategy has been one of deep engagement 
with active security alliances and responsibility for regional stability. As the 
system becomes more constrained with the rise of other great powers such as 
China and the West declines economically, does American deep engagement 
still make sense? If the U.S. is in the early phases of relative decline, conven-
tional logic suggests that “great powers moderate their foreign policy ambi-
tions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value”1 through exer-
cising greater strategic restraint.2 Many analysts now call for the U.S. to scale 
back its ambition and retrench to avoid being sucked into regional wars, and 
to focus its resources in areas of greater concern.
Arguably, the Middle East has felt the American impulse toward retrenchment 
more than most regions. Former President Obama’s pivot to Asia sent a very 
clear signal that the U.S. wished to concentrate its resources on managing Chi-
na’s rise. His now infamous failure to reinforce America’s “red line” in Syria, 
after the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, only further 
weakened the U.S. credibility. While President Trump has sought to reassure 
regional allies like Saudi Arabia of the U.S.’ continued commitment, he re-
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mains reluctant to commit the U.S. 
to nation-building or ‘boots on the 
ground,’ a reticence no doubt com-
plicated by Russia’s now more asser-
tive footprint in the region. 
This then leads us to a question that 
this paper will attempt to answer: 
what happens when America be-
comes more reluctant to take on the 
mantle of stabilizing regional secu-
rity orders, at least in the interests of 
their regional allies? Theories of ‘ri-
val hegemonic transition’ argue that 
another nation, or group thereof 
may fill the strategic void left by American retrenchment, altering the balance 
of power in ways that are not deemed amenable to U.S. interests. In relation to 
the Middle East, an important question is what exactly the effects of the U.S. 
retrenchment will be “upon the region’s geopolitical order...” Indeed, “Wash-
ington’s retreat onto a more ‘hands off ’ strategic approach may further com-
pound geopolitical contestation and instability across the Middle East.”3 For 
instance, some fear that as America continues to withdraw, China will move 
in, capitalizing on its already large and growing trade linkages with most of the 
region’s states.4 Likewise, there is a related fear that American withdrawal may 
precipitate nuclear weapons proliferation, itself related to the criticism that the 
United States is not doing enough to curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions –criti-
cism that may well accelerate given Trump’s 2018 abrogation of the Iran deal. 
Most obviously, Russia is now operating forcefully in the region, with strong 
support for the Assad regime and close links to Iran. 
Theoretically, Karl Hayne’s work on the successor state model proposes that 
a hegemon seeking to retrench from a regional order can do so more easily if 
there is a suitable ally or other external hegemon that can prevent geopolitical 
instability. He goes on to suggest that two criteria define a potential successor 
state’s suitability: “the capability of its strategic preferences with those of the 
declining state and its military capacity to maintain regional order.” So which 
states fit such a description? In this paper, we seek to empirically explore some 
of these broader theoretical points as the Gulf and Middle East become stra-
tegically less important to the U.S. national security interests. We do so by 
examining the UK’s turn to ‘east of Suez.’ This has been driven by a range of 
factors, but mostly by the opening precipitated by America’s declining inter-
est in the region. The U.S. and the UK share many similar national security 
interests and the UK has a long history in the Gulf and the Middle East. We 
will begin by drawing out recent developments in the UK national security 
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strategy and exploring key issues with it moves to east of Suez. The UK’s ongo-
ing relationship with the Middle East will also be conditioned in future years 
by the likely exit of the UK from the European Union (EU). While the UK 
already has significant strategic and commercial interests across the states of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), it is possible that a post-Brexit UK will 
view the GCC states as primary partners in security and markets for commer-
cial interests, building upon its extant and relatively stable relationships at a 
time when uncertainty may be the norm in regard to the UK’s engagements 
elsewhere. 
The UK Returns to ‘East of Suez’ 
As argued in the 2013 paper, “A Return to east of Suez? UK Military Deploy-
ment to the Persian Gulf,” the UK has sought to deepen its presence in east of 
Suez in the Gulf.5 The unveiling of sets of military, defense, and trade arrange-
ments between Whitehall and the governments of the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar announced in mid-April 2013 has been 
consolidated with the HMS Juffair, a now permanent naval base in Bahrain 
and the al-Minhad air base near Dubai, a key platform for the coalition’s air 
campaign against ISIS. This ‘deeper engagement’ in the region by the UK pres-
ents challenges, opportunities and a delicate balancing act between often shift-
ing alliances subject to both regional and global balances of power. 
Specifically, the UK’s now consolidated return to ‘east of Suez’ has committed 
Whitehall to the security and longevity of the Arab Gulf States –sheikhdoms 
which display only limited, if any, elements of democratization and which 
have taken positions opposed to the transformational dynamics seen in the 
in ‘Arab Spring’ events across the Middle East; notwithstanding Qatar’s im-
portant engagements and Saudi Arabia’s activities in Syria, the sheikhdoms 
certainly move to prevent any expression of change in the Gulf itself. As such, 
by following a strategy of allying itself with counter-revolutionary powers in 
the Arab Gulf States, the UK has found itself very much on the fault line of the 
searing sectarianism that is increasingly defining the geopolitical landscape of 
Gulf and Middle Eastern security. The UK will have to tread a delicate regional 
path: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and (less so) Kuwait are now all contending 
with significant sectarian challenges to their internal security whilst Iran and 
Saudi Arabia are engaged in what was a sectarian cold war and is now an in-
creasingly hot one. The ongoing proxy campaigns between the two regional 
hegemons in Yemen and Syria will only add volatility to that evolving security 
matrix. 
Importantly, the international relations context for the UK’s strategy of deep 
engagement in east of Suez is not just about securing loyal and wealthy allies in 
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the Persian Gulf, but has wider global geopolitical import. Specifically, it is also 
a new, different, iteration of the trans-Atlantic special relationship –a relation-
ship which has been strained in recent years. With the ‘Obama Pivot’ serving 
to re-focus U.S. efforts away from the Middle East and towards the Far East and 
Pacific Rim, the pull of the potential vacuum in the Gulf region, particularly 
for the UK, is strong. Just as the U.S. was drawn into Gulf and Middle East pol-
itics by the UK’s withdrawal of east of Suez in 1971, the situation now seems to 
be in the process of being reversed, with the UK moving early, perhaps oppor-
tunistically, to fill the potential vacuum that would be created by a downsizing 
of the U.S. interests and presence, itself part of a broader U.S. grand strategic 
recalibration from deep engagement to regional retrenchment.6 In effect, for 
the UK, heightened strategic engagement with the Arab Gulf States and with 
India are new geopolitical expressions of the U.S.-UK special relationship –an 
expression that may be designed to emphasize to the U.S. the continued value 
of the UK as a strategic underwriter of the broader U.S.-led liberal interna-
tional order. For example, the 2015 UK Strategic Defense and Security Review 
made explicit that the UK’s value to the U.S. was contingent on its stabilizing 
role: “Our contribution to the special relationship includes our European and 
global reach and influence… We work together to support peace and stability” 
with a “permanent and more substantial UK military presence” in the Gulf 
region designed to “reflect our historic relationships, the long-term nature of 
both challenges and opportunities and to reassure our Gulf allies.” 
The UK’s Involvement in Gulf Security
The ‘return east of Suez’7 is an emotive phrase, on both the Left and the Right 
in British politics. It recalls the highly controversial decision by Harold Wil-
son’s Labor government between 1966 and 1968 to oversee a broad global re-
trenchment of UK military power. 
While Labor ministers such as Tony Benn, Richard Crossman, and Barbara 
Castle rejoiced in the sounding of ‘the death-knell of the British empire east 
of Suez,’8 the former Conservative Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 
called the decision to withdraw “a dereliction of stewardship, the like of which 
Just as the U.S. was drawn into Gulf and 
Middle East politics by the UK’s withdrawal of 
east of Suez in 1971, the situation now seems 
to be in the process of being reversed, with the 
UK moving early, perhaps opportunistically, to 
fill the potential vacuum
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this country has not seen in the conduct of foreign policy before.”9 It should be 
noted, however, that after the Conservatives returned to power in 1970 under 
Edward Heath, they failed to follow their rhetoric in opposition, instead going 
ahead with the military withdrawal from east of Suez. All eyes, whether on the 
Left or the Right, were set on a European future in the EEC and NATO. As a 
fig leaf to cover the withdrawal, Britain retained a ‘capability’ to send forces 
back to east of Suez.10 But there were only small military footholds at Diego 
Garcia, in the British Indian Ocean Territories, Brunei, Hong Kong (until the 
handover to China in 1997), and a refueling station (literally a floating dock) 
at Singapore to enable the UK to carry out its commitment in Southeast Asia 
as required by the terms of the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA).11
Yet, with regard to Arabia and the Gulf, the formal withdrawal from major 
bases east of Suez did not signal the end of British military involvement –far 
from it. The undignified scuttle from Aden in 1967 soon led the new Marx-
ist-Leninist regime in South Yemen to intervene on behalf of the rebels in the 
Dhofar province of the neighboring Sultanate of Oman. The threat of a Sovi-
et-backed revolutionary regime in Oman, controlling the Arabian side of the 
Strait of Hormuz, led the Heath government to send in the SAS to help the 
Sultan’s armed forces, along with a large Iranian Army contingent, to defeat 
the insurgency by 1975. Four years later the Royal Navy was back in the Gulf 
with the Armilla patrol, performing its traditional role, in support of the U.S. 
Navy, of policing the maritime peace as the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 spilled 
into the Gulf. That the Royal Navy should have returned was evidence enough 
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of the folly of leaving the guardianship of the Gulf to two of its traditional an-
tagonistic heavyweights, Iran and Saudi Arabia, under the U.S. government’s 
pointless ‘twin-pillars’ policy. 
The collapse of the Iranian pillar, with the fall of the Shah in 1979, raised seri-
ous questions about the stability of the remaining Saudi one and, indeed, the 
continued viability of the U.S. policy. It took the third heavyweight, Iraq under 
Saddam Hussein, to reveal, in three large-scale and bloody wars (1980-1988, 
1990-1991, and 2003-2011), the consequences of the collapse of the state sys-
tem in the Gulf following Britain’s withdrawal in 1971, and the dangers of en-
gaging with local aggressors –whether through confrontation or appeasement. 
As part of the U.S.-led coalitions Britain had to commit large forces in both 
1990-1991 and 2003-2007 to help defeat the successive attempts by Iraq to alter 
the balance of power in the Gulf. 
In addition to its repeated military interventions in Arabia and the Gulf, usu-
ally in concert with the United States, Britain followed the American lead after 
1971 and engaged in the wholesale export of advanced weapons systems to the 
Arab Gulf States. These usually came with training teams, to add to military 
officers already on secondment to the armed forces of these states. As the An-
glo-Saudi al-Yamamah I and II projects show, these were enormously lucrative 
for the British defense industry and helped successive British governments to 
subsidize the costs of equipping the British armed forces. The deal, which saw 
the UK receive payment in the form of 600,000 barrels of oil per day, to an 
estimated value of £40 billion over 30 years, constituted the UK’s largest ever 
export arrangement.12 However, it has proved to be as controversial as it has 
been lucrative. The downside of these agreements came with the complicated 
oil-barter, offset and export-credit aspects, not to mention allegations of kick-
backs to brokers. Coupled with the significant investments of the sovereign 
wealth funds of the Arab Gulf States in British property, companies, banks 
and universities, we can see how intertwined and interdependent Britain’s re-
lationship with these states has become in the last forty years.13 They have a 
vested strategic interest in each other’s survival to such an extent that it could 
be argued that Britain never really disengaged from east of Suez, or at least 
from Arabia and the Gulf. But does this mean that Britain is committed to the 
defense of the Arab Gulf States in the way it was before 1971, and the formal 
retreat from its major bases east of Suez?
The Military Vision
Tradition has it that the UK Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS) gives a state of the 
armed forces speech to the RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) each Christ-
mas. These speeches are usually a routine restatement of policies that have 
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been in the public purview for some 
time. However, General Sir David 
Richards speech on the evening of 
December 17, 2012 was different. 
In his speech Sir David articulated 
a vision of the future that radiated 
confidence, optimism and above all, 
boldness, when discussing the new 
Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), the 
Royal Navy’s maritime and amphib-
ious components and the future of 
the Army’s brigades. One section of 
his speech was especially striking: 
“Britain’s JEF will be capable of projecting power with global effect and influ-
ence. Nowhere is more important to us than our friends in the Middle East 
and Gulf and in line with clear political intent we would expect, with other 
initiatives, for JEF elements to spend more time reassuring and deterring in 
the region.” 
He went on to provide more detail as to how the “Royal Navy will continue to 
grow in importance. As our carrier capability comes into service it will be a key 
part of our diplomatic, humanitarian and military strategy.” And, in line with 
the Army 2020 reforms, “[w]hile we will retain three high-readiness maneuver 
brigades, we will also have ‘adaptable brigades’ to sustain enduring operations 
and routinely develop partnerships around the world.” As for the deployment 
of these brigades, 
I envisage two or more adaptable brigades forming close tactical level relation-
ships with particular countries in the Gulf and Jordan, for example, allowing 
for better cooperation with their forces. Should the need arise for another Lib-
ya-style operation, we will be prepared. This would greatly enhance our ability 
to support allies as they contain and deter threats and with our naval presence 
in Bahrain, air elements in the UAE and Qatar, and traditional but potentially 
enhanced roles in Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, would make us a regional 
ally across the spectrum.14
To this end, and consolidating these trends, a late 2014 announcement con-
firmed the establishment of the HMS Juffair at the Mina Salman facility in 
Bahrain, a permanent naval base and the first of its kind for the UK since 
1971. Construction started in late 2015 with then UK’s defense secretary, 
Philip Hammond, declaring that the establishment of the facility meant that 
the “presence of the Royal Navy in Bahrain is guaranteed into the future, en-
suring Britain’s sustained presence east of Suez” and was “just one example 
In terms of both public 
statements and circumstantial 
evidence, the UK seems to be 
committed to deepening its 
strategic defense relationship 
with the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, 
and Oman, and its ties with 
Saudi Arabia are stronger than 
ever before
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of our growing partnership with Gulf partners to tackle shared strategic and 
regional threats,” most notably the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. However, the 
realization that the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers will not be able to 
berth at the Mina Salman facility illustrated that the decision as to where to es-
tablish bases in the Gulf may be driven more by political considerations rather 
than those of military rationale and need. 
Similarly, the al-Minhad air base in the UAE, some 24 km south of Dubai, saw 
a flurry of UK activity, with the runway being extended and improved and fa-
cilities installed to allow for the basing of Tornados and helicopters –with the 
focus, at the time, being to show a muscular presence against Iran. In effect, 
however, for the UK, the investment in Minhad was more of an insurance pol-
icy –giving the option for the rapid deployment of military forces to a base that 
could be quickly operationalized, with facilities in a mothballed but near-ready 
state. The base also allowed the Royal Air Force (RAF) to undertake closer 
exercises with their Emirati counterparts, including in the areas of coastal se-
curity (again, with Iran as a focus). The base would later be used by the RAF 
and their Australian and Dutch partners in the targeting of the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria –while the focus on Iran evaporated following the removal of 
sanctions in January 2016.
The Army, too, seems to be very keen to engage, particularly in the aftermath 
of the withdrawal of the British Army of the Rhine from Germany and the 
loss of prime exercise ranges on the continent without any large-scale re-
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placement, until, perhaps now. By 
re-engaging with the Sultanate of 
Oman, the Army would find itself 
located in a country of very signif-
icant geopolitical positioning, with 
thousands of square miles of un-
populated territory ideally suited to 
the training of military units in the 
skills necessary to deploy to areas of 
similar climate and environmental 
extremes (Oman has a subtropical 
dry climate, and has both deserts 
and mountains), and where its units would be received by a government that 
has always maintained strong links with the UK, both institutionally and in 
terms of the personal links enjoyed between elites in both countries. 
It would, of course, be impossible to leave the irrepressible Qatar out of any 
development as significant as the British returning to the Gulf. With the long 
established personal links that exist between Qatari elites and the UK, and the 
overt and successful attempts by Doha to be involved in international affairs, 
including in the Arab Spring transitions across the Middle East (though they 
have been rather less forthcoming at being involved in such events in the Gulf, 
in Bahrain, for example) and in their immense financial power generated by 
their huge LNG exports (between 2015 to 2017, Qatar alone has supplied 93 
percent of the UK’s LNG gas needs),15 it was to be expected that David Cam-
eron made noticeable efforts to further the links between London and Doha, 
with the Qatari Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani visiting Downing 
Street in October 2010, and with the then prime minister visiting the emir 
in early 2011.16 With Qatar not needing further assistance in the area of air 
defense with the U.S. Air Force located at the al-Udeid base west of Doha, and 
being less attractive to the Army than Oman, Qatar seems exceptionally well 
placed to take on a coordinating or liaison-type presence for a coordinated 
UK command. With the emir investing heavily in Doha as the focal point of 
political, economic, and cultural life in the Gulf (in competition with Dubai 
and, increasingly, Abu Dhabi), the range of international organizations and 
Western interests that are basing themselves on the Qatari peninsula provides 
a useful networking location in a wider regional environment that still remains 
inherently conservative. 
Consolidating these developments, the UK opened a new naval base in Bah-
rain in April 2018. “Our presence in Bahrain will play a vital role in keeping 
Britain safe as well as underpinning security in the Gulf,” UK defense secretary 
Gavin Williamson argued: “What happens in the Gulf region has a direct im-
pact on the national security of the United Kingdom, our prosperity and the 
It is undeniable that the 
UK defense and policy 
establishment still finds it 
straightforward, enjoyable 
even, to engage with their 
equivalents in the Gulf in a way, 
perhaps, that has often eluded 
the Americans
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safety of our citizens,” particularly with the UK’s relationship with Gulf and 
Middle Eastern allies vital to containing threats such as ISIS.17 
As such, in terms of both public statements and circumstantial evidence, the 
UK seems to be committed to deepening its strategic defense relationship with 
the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, and its ties with Saudi Arabia –which, as 
home to Islam’s two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, would not permit foreign 
forces to be present– are stronger than ever before. 
Gulf Security and the Special Relationship
In the post-war international system, the United States has been the key exter-
nal hegemon in the Gulf. With the bitter experience of Iraq and Afghanistan in 
mind, as well the U.S. view that East Asia will be the demographic, economic 
and geopolitical hub of 21st century international relations, we are perhaps 
witnessing a change in the U.S. grand strategy from one of deep engagement 
to one of retrenchment, albeit with regional variations dependent on its re-
spective reading of each region’s value to the U.S. national security interests. 
Whichever way you read it, it is clear that the Gulf and Middle East more gen-
erally has been downgraded in the U.S.’ relative assessment of priorities, and 
that the U.S. would now far rather ‘lead from behind’ in the region. President 
Trump has committed to the region more, but in limited ways and in the con-
text of other external powers, most notably Russia and to a lesser extent China, 
becoming more greatly involved and thus constraining the U.S.’ freedom of 
action. It is in this context, and amid the changing regional geopolitics and 
balances of power that the UK is pursuing its broader Gulf strategy of deep 
engagement. Why? 
First, there is considerable economic benefit for the UK to be not only the 
leading European player in the Gulf, but also the leading Western one. And it is 
undeniable that the UK defense and policy establishment still finds it straight-
forward, enjoyable even, to engage with their equivalents in the Gulf in a way, 
perhaps, that has often eluded the Americans. There is also a ‘domestic’ mili-
tary rationale for the UK, which has had its decades of experience of maintain-
ing forces overseas suddenly curtailed, meaning that some of those elements 
that had made the UK military distinctive from their European counterparts 
have been eroded. There is also, however, a further pillar supporting the UK’s 
initiative to re-engage with the Gulf, and that is its special relationship with the 
U.S. In many ways, the CDS’s RUSI speech and the actions of UK senior poli-
ticians should be seen as signaling to Washington, Europe and the Gulf States, 
Britain’s military intent to do more in the Gulf, with the object of keeping all 
concerned engaged with the defense tasks in hand, including but not limited 
to sending reassurance signals to key regional players; helping mediate the 
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now increasingly ‘hot’ geopolitical balance between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran; and degrading and where 
possible containing the threat of ISIS. On a more 
abstract but nonetheless fundamentally important 
‘status’ level, the UK has a key interest in continu-
ing to play a global role as a relevant top-tier power 
helping strategically underpin the still U.S.-led lib-
eral international order; what the Strategic Defence 
and Security Review (SDSR) 2015 called the “rules-
based international order.”18 After all, it is this order 
that provides the context for global trade, the UK’s 
key security alliances and the broader institutional 
instantiation of the rules based international system 
of which the UK does not want to be a mere ‘free-
rider.’ These links will only become more important 
in the wake of Brexit and the UK’s search for global 
trade links and deals. 
In reasserting its presence in the Gulf, the UK is 
once again maintaining a keen focus on what has 
underpinned its security and defense strategy since 
World War II: maintaining and nurturing its special 
relationship with the U.S. With the Obama Admin-
istration being distinctly ‘cold’ to the notion of any sort of special relationship 
with any country at all, and with the last remaining significant theatre that 
sees the U.S. and UK working closely together, i.e. Afghanistan, having come 
to an unceremonious end in 2014, there is a clear need to ‘do something’ if the 
strategy of being close to the Americans, in terms of political norms, military 
interconnectivities, and global influence, is to be maintained. In being the 
first of the European states to move so swiftly into the maelstrom of Middle 
East and Gulf politics, and in such a willing way, the UK is positioning itself 
at the heart of a region that will remain keenly important to the U.S. in the 
future, but not quite so important as areas to the east. In short, the UK is 
returning to east of Suez in order to maintain the special relationship with 
the U.S., captured succinctly in the SDSR 2015: “The U.S. is our preeminent 
partner for security, defense, foreign policy and prosperity. Our contribution 
to the special relationship includes our European and global reach and influ-
ence … We work together to support peace and stability”19 with a “permanent 
and more substantial UK military presence” in the Gulf region designed to 
“reflect our historic relationships, the long-term nature of both challenges 
and opportunities and to reassure our Gulf allies. We have begun work on a 
new naval base in Bahrain, HMS Juffair, to support Royal Navy deployments 
in the region, and we will establish a new British Defense Staff in the Middle 
East.”20
In being the first of 
the European states 
to move so swiftly 
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Middle East and Gulf 
politics, and in such 
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242 Insight Turkey
GARETH STANSFIELD, DOUG STOKES, and SAUL KELLYARTICLE
A Brexit Imperative?
As a part of the world with which the UK has long-established strategic and 
commercial interests, the Gulf ’s relative importance to the UK is set to in-
crease if and when the UK leaves the European Union. Theresa May’s govern-
ment has not been slow in attempting to ensure that the ties that bind the GCC 
states with the UK have been preserved and even strengthened. Addressing 
the GCC in December 2016, May emphasized the centuries-old relationship 
between the UK and the states of the Gulf, noting ‘risks to our shared security’ 
and how, in challenging times, “you turn to your oldest and most dependable 
friends.”21 The inference could not be any clearer –that the UK views the states 
of the Gulf as perennial partners, and that the Gulf States should view the UK 
in the same way. Whether the Gulf States do indeed view the UK in this way is 
an interesting question to ask. While the UK’s relationships with some states 
is undoubtedly close, it remains the case that they operate in a global market 
place and the UK, while being well placed to engage with the GCC states, has 
to compete against a range of other international actors that may bring dif-
ferent possibilities and capabilities 
to any arrangement. History is cer-
tainly a powerful motivating factor, 
but not the only one. 
It was perhaps with this in mind 
that subsequent to May’s speech, 
UK International Trade Secretary 
Liam Fox embarked upon an exten-
sive round of overseas visits to the 
Gulf States, including Oman and 
Bahrain. While gaining assurances 
from leaders in the Gulf about their 
relationship with the UK, the visits 
came at some political cost, with critics highlighting the problem of heighten-
ing trade with countries in the region. Emphasizing this, the then leader of the 
Liberal Democrats, Tim Farron, noted in reference to the minister’s visit to Ku-
wait ‘[a]nother day, another desperate visit by Liam Fox to secure a trade deal 
with a country that has a questionable record on human rights… [a]ll because 
the Conservative Brexit government is hell bent on taking us out of the single 
market without even putting the final deal to the British people.’22
Despite such criticisms, the tempo of engagement was maintained, and even 
increased, throughout 2018. Following a state visit to the UK by Saudi crown 
prince Mohammed bin Salman in March 2018, it was announced that Saudi 
Arabia would purchase a further 48 Typhoon multi-role fighters, bringing the 
total value of arms export licenses granted to Saudi Arabia by the UK since 
By returning to the Gulf, 
the UK will be sending a 
clear signal that, in the Arab 
Gulf at least, it supports the 
preservation of uneven or anti-
democratic regimes at a time 
when revolutionary forces are 
sweeping across the Middle 
East and Islamic world
2018 Fall 243
UK STRATEGY IN THE GULF AND MIDDLE EAST AFTER AMERICAN RETRENCHMENT
the commencement of the war in Yemen in 2015 to $6.3 billion. This stood in 
stark contrast to other EU members, including Germany that had suspended 
their arms sales to Saudi Arabia.23 For the UK, it would seem, strategic and 
commercial imperatives have begun to outweigh the earlier policy imperatives 
of good governance and democratization, leading a French observer to con-
clude that “[UK] foreign policy will revolve around maintaining trade flows, 
diplomatic influence and military footholds. Beyond a few vague, perfunctory 
statements, the funding of extremism and human rights violations will con-
tinue to be ignored.”24
Unintended Consequences 
Engagement in the Gulf is not a straightforward matter. Indeed, few regions of 
the world have as much potential for instability, with threats emanating from 
a range of possibilities. Arguably, the principal context for current tensions 
remains the fraught geopolitical relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
both of which vie for regional hegemony and whose national security interests 
now extend into a range of proxy wars ranging from the continued and bloody 
insurgency in Syria, to the rise of ISIS, to the ongoing Saudi-led campaign 
against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. Of major concern to the 
undemocratic sheikhdoms, emirates, and kingdoms of the Arab Gulf, domi-
nated by Sunni elite, is the political mobilization of Arab Shia communities 
in these states. With Iraq already witnessing the consolidation of a new nar-
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rative of nationhood constructed 
around a majority Shia identity, the 
Gulf States have been openly ner-
vous since 2003 of a potential rise 
in Shia militancy and with good 
reason. Arab Shia communities 
have long been denigrated as sec-
ond-class citizens in the Arab Gulf 
States. In Saudi Arabia, for example, 
some 15 percent of citizens are Shia, 
and this population is concentrated 
in the oil-rich Eastern Province. The execution of the prominent Shia cleric 
Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr by the Saudis in January 2016 served to further inflame 
the already deep hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The situation in 
countries where Shia are numerous, but not a majority, is difficult, with their 
leaders making demands for human rights to be recognized in countries that 
traditionally have a relaxed view of such matters, such as in Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. In places where they are in a majority however, such as in Bahrain, the 
situation is far more severe. Indeed, in Bahrain –a possible and likely location 
for Royal Navy bases to be established– the country has remained highly de-
stabilized since the commencement of anti-government demonstrations, asso-
ciated principally with the Shia community, in February 2011. These demon-
strations have been forcefully put down by Bahrain’s security services, notably 
with the involvement of Saudi forces. 
The ramifications for the UK in forging very close political and military rela-
tionships with the Arab Gulf States are without any doubt potentially serious. 
By returning to the Gulf, the UK will be sending a clear signal that, in the Arab 
Gulf at least, it supports the preservation of uneven or anti-democratic re-
gimes at a time when revolutionary forces are sweeping across the Middle East 
and Islamic world, and generating more and more legitimacy. It may therefore 
prove to be unfortunate timing, to say the least, to be backing anti-revolu-
tionary regimes; the UK, in so doing, will be wide open to the accusation that 
defense and trade contracts with these states outweigh the moral obligation of 
pursuing universal human rights and the promotion of democratic norms. The 
perception of the Gulf States toward the UK plans may also be different from 
how the UK views its engagement. The threat perception of the Gulf States 
is increasingly focused upon ‘hard’ power crises and domestic instabilities, 
which are assuaged by having in place treaties that serve to protect them from 
their enemies outside and, perhaps, within. But the UK approach –impressive 
though it is– remains very much of the ‘soft’ power variety, with the Adaptive 
Brigades earmarked for possible deployment not being structured for signifi-
cant combat operations, nor being ‘at readiness.’ By the CDS’s own admission 
in the RUSI speech, they will be, in effect, large and capable training teams. 
If the UK is serious in its focus 
on the Arab Gulf, once again, 
then a straightforward question 
needs to be answered, this 
being where is the clear strategic 
purpose in the return to ‘east of 
Suez’?
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While the very act of targeted, focused, and intensive training can certainly 
send messages, it is a bold calculation to make, and a very big assumption to 
believe that these messages would be interpreted in this way, for example, in 
Tehran. At an abstract, theoretical, level, the substitution of the U.S. presence 
with a UK one may make sense, but this can never be a like-for-like replace-
ment. No matter how capable the Royal Navy may be, its limited presence 
(presumably, at most, a small number of frigates and destroyers) in Bahrain 
and the basing of an Army outfit focused upon training in Oman, along with 
a handful of Typhoons in the UAE, is tokenism of the sort that communicates 
one message but lacks the credibility of being able to act as a deterrent, or a 
force capable of proactive and successful engagement. Rather, there is a danger 
that the deployment would be of a size big enough to ‘get us into trouble,’ and 
not get us out of it when the trouble starts. 
In all likelihood, however, a classic ‘muddle-through’ will be formulated that 
presents the UK actions and the closer relationship with Arab Gulf States as 
ultimately seeking to work, in a soft-power way, towards the improving of 
domestic political situations, with what would for some be a great liberal di-
lemma remaining acknowledged but unresolvable for the duration of this re-
invigorated partnership. But, to what end? Before 1971, being ‘east of Suez’ 
had a strategic rationale, had purpose, and could be clearly articulated with 
reference to imperial legacies, the need to contain the USSR, and the economic 
benefits of access to oil. It made sense, until the hard-financial aspects of being 
there became apparent. If the UK is serious in its focus on the Arab Gulf, once 
again, then a straightforward question needs to be answered, this being where 
is the clear strategic purpose in the return to ‘east of Suez’? If it is to deter Iran, 
then this requires a strategy that has to be multifaceted, internationally man-
dated, and with a credible and significant military force made available. Presi-
dent Trump’s recent abrogation of the Iran nuclear deal, and the splits this has 
exposed in transatlantic relations, will only complicate the UK’s delicate bal-
ancing act. If a return is to strengthen the UK’s ties to the Arab Gulf States, for 
a range of reasons including defense, trade, and investments, then this should 
be acknowledged publicly along with an articulation of why such engagements 
are necessary, in a period that sees the entire region in a state of political flux, 
complicated significantly now with the bold assertion of Russia’s interests in 
the Syrian quagmire. This is not to make a value judgment that such alliances 
are wrong, but they do need to be outlined, articulated, and defended, ideally 
in reference to a broader strategy and sense of UK national interests, rather 
than hidden and left assumed. 
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